Abstract. I analyze a simple model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. I show that contractual signalling and e¢ ciency of investment can con ‡ict if only quantity is contractible. This is because contracted quantity encourages investment in the relationship but also signals information. This con ‡ict generates ine¢ cient equilibria in terms of investment. Contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the con ‡ict (and consequently eliminates the ine¢ ciency of investment) when the asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. While exclusivity also signals information, unlike quantity it does not directly a¤ect relationship-speci…c investment.
Introduction
Many relationships are formed under asymmetric information. When two or more parties meet to agree on the terms of a future relationship, some of them may have relevant private information about how successful the relationship will be. For example, in vertical relationships, a …nal good producer contracting with a speci…c supplier about future trade may have private information about her future value of trading with the supplier. Similarly, a manufacturer o¤ering a franchising agreement to a retailer may be better informed than the retailer about the retailer's ability to sell his product. As was emphasized by Myerson (1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1992) , in these cases, if the parties with private information participate in the design of the contract (or the terms of the relationship if established in an informal way), the contract's terms may reveal some of their private information to the other parties. Because of this information transmission e¤ect, the design of the contract assumes a strategic role not present when contracting parties have symmetric information. If investment in the relationship is important, this role is in addition to the e¢ ciency role of providing the parties with the right incentives to invest that is typical to the hold-up problem literature.
In this paper, I consider a simple model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. In the model a principal (e.g., a buyer) with private information wishes to encourage an agent (e.g., a supplier) to make a relationship-speci…c investment. I analyze how the two roles of contracting mentioned above interact with one another and highlight a pro-e¢ ciency role of exclusivity agreements. I …rst consider the case of quantity contracts (or, so-called speci…c-performance contracts, which specify the default number of units the parties will trade) and show that because of information concerns, the principal may distort the contract's terms away from those that generate incentives for e¢ cient investment in the relationship. I then consider the case of contracts that in addition to quantity specify an exclusivity clause that restricts the principal to trade only with the agent, and show that exclusivity plays an important role in eliminating such contractual distortions and thereby the ine¢ ciency of investment. This result rationalizes the use of contracts that specify both quantity and exclusivity. It also rationalizes the use of exclusivity in situations of hold-up with pure relationship-speci…c investments.
Both the contractual distortions and the e¤ect of contractibility of exclusivity on relationshipspeci…c investment highlighted here are novel in the literature. This is because the existing literature on the hold-up problem (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996; and Che and Hausch, 1999) , and in particular that on the interaction between exclusivity and relationship-speci…c investment (e.g., Segal and Whinston, 2000; and De Meza and Selvaggi, 2007) , has focused on situations where parties'information is symmetric at the initial contracting stage.
The model I consider is a standard model of hold-up, with the exception that at the contracting stage the party who proposes the contract has private information. Speci…cally, I consider a model in which a principal and an agent …rst meet and contract about future transactions, while knowing that later on, the principal may wish to trade with an external party instead. Possible contractual agreements include: a contracted quantity, which corresponds to the default quantity that parties will trade; and a contracted level of exclusivity, restricting the principal to trade only with the agent. At the initial contracting stage, both parties are uncertain about the value of the relationship, but the principal has better information about how successful it will be. This is either because she is better informed about how much she values trade with the agent (private internal information) or because she is better informed about the value of her future outside options (private external information). I consider both cases of internal and external information because, as I show, the source of asymmetry of information a¤ects which forms of contractual commitment are e¤ective in signalling information. Once both parties agree on a contract, a relationship is formed and the agent has the opportunity to invest in it. At a latter date, uncertainty is realized and both the principal and the agent observe the value of trading with each other and the value of the principal's trade with others. At this point, the principal and agent renegotiate the initial contract whenever it is ine¢ cient. 1 Although renegotiated, the initial contract still matters because it determines the status quo positions of both parties (disagreement point) during renegotiation. I …nd that if the contract can specify quantity but not exclusivity, signalling information by the principal to extract surplus from the agent and e¢ ciency of investment can con ‡ict with one another. This con ‡ict generates ine¢ cient equilibria, as the principal contracts a quantity that distorts the agent's investment decision relative to its socially e¢ cient level to signal information. I also show that when the principal's private information is internal, contractibility of exclusivity does not a¤ect the set of equilibrium outcomes. As a consequence, when the principal has private internal information only, the possibility to use exclusivity in addition to quantity in the contract does not play any role in mitigating the con ‡ict between surplus extraction and investment incentives.
I …nally show that in contrast with the case of internal information, when the principal's private information is external, the con ‡ict between signalling information to extract surplus and investment incentives can be resolved if the principal can use both quantity and exclusivity in the contract. This is because, when the principal's private information is about the value of her outside option, exclusivity serves as a strong signal of that information; and because, in contrast to contracted quantity, exclusivity does not a¤ect directly the agent's investment decision. Thus, when both quantity and exclusivity are contractible, the principal can set contracted quantity to induce optimal investment by the agent, and then adjust contracted exclusivity, without a¤ecting the agent's investment decision, in a way that the combination of the signalling e¤ects of contracted quantity and exclusivity allow her to signal information and extract surplus.
The e¢ ciency e¤ect of exclusivity identi…ed here is important for two reasons. First, in contrast to Segal and Whinston (2000) , it rationalizes the use of exclusive contracts in situations of hold-up with pure relationship-speci…c investments. Motivated by informal discussions (in anti-trust and exclusive contracts) on whether exclusive provisions foster relationship-speci…c investments, Segal and Whinston (2000) show that exclusivity does not a¤ect whatsoever investments that are fully relationship-speci…c, when information is symmetric at the contracting stage. 2 Second, it contributes to the unsettled debate on whether exclusive agreements should be contractually allowed by courts or not. In this speci…c matter, a long-standing concern of courts is that exclusive contracts serve anticompetitive purposes, and consequently prevent e¢ ciency. By studying contractual signalling by an informed party in the presence of relationshipspeci…c investment, this paper is inherently related to two strands of the literature: the literature on the hold-up problem and the literature on contract design by an informed party. The existing literature on the hold-up problem assumes symmetric information at the initial contracting stage (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1990; Chung, 1991; Rogerson, 1992; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Aghion et al., 1994; and Segal and Whinston, 2000) . By studying contract design by an informed party in a relationship with speci…c investments, this paper extends the literature on the hold-up problem to the case in which there is asymmetric information at the contracting stage. In the hold-up problem literature (with symmetric information at the contracting stage), the contract is typically designed with one goal: to provide the right incentives to invest. The presence of asymmetric information at the contracting stage introduces a new role for the contract: signalling information to extract surplus.
The literature on contract design by an informed principal can be divided into two groups. The …rst group focuses on the characterization (in a general way) of the equilibrium contract proposal by an informed principal in a principal-agent relationship (e.g., Myerson, 1983; Maskin and Tirole, 1990; Maskin and Tirole, 1992; and Beaudry and Poitevin, 1993) . The modelling approach is this paper is in the spirit of that in Maskin and Tirole (1992) . In the context of the model in this paper, I extend their analysis and results to the case in which the agent makes a noncontractible investment decision. This extension is not a trivial one. Maskin and Tirole (1992) assume that all payo¤ relevant variables are contractible. In their model, the agent's beliefs about the principal's type a¤ect only the agent's decision to accept the contracts proposed by the principal. In the model in this paper those beliefs also a¤ect the agent's investment decision, which in turn a¤ects the principal's payo¤ (and preferences over contracts). So, in here, the agent's beliefs at the end of the contracting phase are still important. The second group of this literature has studied contract design by an informed party in more concrete settings (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Aghion and Hermalin, 1990; Spier, 1992; and Nosal, 2006) . 3 The articles in this literature have not studied speci…cally the relationship between contractual signalling and relationship-speci…c investment. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present the model. In Section 3, I establish the result that exclusivity is irrelevant in terms of equilibrium outcomes when the principal's private information is internal. In Section 4, I analyze equilibrium outcomes when contracts specify only quantity and then when contracts can specify both quantity Figure 1 . Sequence of events.
and exclusivity. I show the existence of ine¢ cient equilibria in terms of investment and how exclusivity resolves this ine¢ ciency. In Section 5, I present concluding remarks.
The Model
The model delineated in this section and the subsequent analysis are presented in terms of a generic trade relationship between a principal with private information and an agent who can invest in the relationship by preparing for trade. The following are trivial applications of the model: (i) a buyer with private information about how much she values a given product contracting with a supplier about the quantity to be delivered, when the supplier still has to design the product and initiate its production; (ii) a manufacturer with private information about her production cost contracting with a retailer about supply conditions (e.g., quantity and/or the concession of an exclusive territory to the retailer), when the retailer still has to invest in the handling, proper storage and promotion of the manufacturer's product. I next present the model.
Players and sequence of events. Consider a principal and an agent who initially contract, knowing that the principal may later wish to deal with an external party instead. If they agree on a contract, a relationship is formed. If not, the principal and agent obtain their reservation payo¤s (which are the expected value of dealing later with an external party and zero, respectively) and the game ends.
Once a relationship is formed, it evolves in three stages: (i) an investment stage, in which the agent has the opportunity to make a relationship-speci…c investment a 2 A R + 0 ; (ii) a renegotiation stage, which occurs after uncertainty about trade valuations is realized and where the principal and the agent renegotiate the terms of the initial contract; and (iii) a trading stage. Trade between the principal and the agent may never occur. At the renegotiation stage, parties may decide not to deal with each other if after uncertainty is resolved it is actually more e¢ cient for the principal to trade with an external party than with the agent. The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Payoffs. The parties'payo¤s are quasi-linear in money. The agent's payo¤ is additive in the investment cost, which is denoted by (a) and assumed to be increasing in a. In addition to any money transfers, if at the trading stage the principal and agent trade with each other, they obtain values of v P and v A , respectively. For future convenience, the value of trade between the principal and the agent is denoted V v P + v A . 4 The value of trade between the principal and an external party is denoted by V E . For simplicity, I assume that V E is always non-negative. Information. During the contracting and investment stages (ex-ante) trade valuations are still uncertain, but the principal is better informed about them than the agent. This is formalized by assuming that the principal knows the true state of the world 2 f L ; H g, while the agent knows only its prior probability p( ); and by assuming that the joint distribution of the valuations v P , v A and V E depends not only on the agent's investment a but also on state , i.e., (v P ; v A ; V E ) F (: j a; ). After the investment stage, but before renegotiation, uncertainty is realized and both the principal and agent observe the realization of valuations v A , v P and V E . Hence, renegotiation and trading (ex-post) occur under symmetric information. Although observable by the parties, valuations cannot be veri…ed by a court. Therefore, contracts that are directly contingent on valuations are not feasible.
Contracting. At the contracting stage, the principal has the opportunity to make a "take it or leave it" o¤er to the agent of a …nite menu of contracts. If the agent accepts the menu, the principal herself then chooses a contract from the menu (throughout, the principal is feminine and the agent is masculine). This is the contract that governs the relationship between the principal and the agent. By allowing the principal to propose menus of contracts, I follow an approach similar to that in Maskin and Tirole (1992) when analyzing the problem of mechanism design by an informed principal.
The potentially contractible variables are: an up-front transfer t from the agent to the principal, a quantity q, and a level of exclusivity e. The up-front transfer can take any real value, t 2 R. (A negative t corresponds to a transfer from the principal to the agent.) Quantity q denotes the probability that the principal and the agent must trade. The exclusivity variable e denotes the probability that the agreement is exclusive; i.e., that the principal cannot trade with an external party. 5 Throughout, the set of allowable quantities is denoted by Q and that of allowable exclusivity levels by E. When both quantity and exclusivity are contractible, Q = [0; 1] and E = [0; 1]. Noncontractible exclusivity is modeled by imposing E = f0g. A contract is an object of the form c = (t; q; e) 2 C, where C = R Q E. The agent's investment decision is not veri…able and therefore cannot be contractually speci…ed. 6 4 Suppose, for example, that the principal is a buyer, the agent is seller with production cost c, and the buyer needs at most one unit of the seller's product. In this case, vP corresponds to the buyer's valuation of the seller's product and vA = c. The value created if the buyer and the seller trade is V = vP + vA = vP c. 5 The quantity and exclusivity variables can be interpreted as proportions of trade capacity. Under this interpretation, quantity q represents the proportion of the trade capacity of the principal that is contractually allocated to the agent, and exclusivity e represents the proportion of the remaining (1 q) of the trade capacity of the principal that cannot be traded with an external party. The assumption that e is a proportion is not crucial. All the results in the paper hold if contracts can only prescribe full exclusivity (e = 1) or full non-exclusivity (e = 0). 6 The existence of relationship-speci…c investments that are noncontractible has been the fundamental assumption in the hold-up problem literature. Relationship-speci…c investments often take a nonmonetary, Renegotiation. After observing the realization of the valuations, if the initial contract prescribes an ine¢ cient level of trade, the principal and the agent renegotiate trade to the e¢ cient level. The agent's investment decision is irreversible at this stage. As in Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) , Che and Hausch (1999) , Segal and Whinston (2000) and Segal and Whinston (2002) , I assume that the bargaining shares of the principal and the agent during renegotiation are exogenously speci…ed. More speci…cally, I assume that the principal and the agent equally divide their renegotiation surplus over the disagreement point, which is determined by the original contract. 7 Thus, despite renegotiation, the original contract still matters because it a¤ects the distribution of ex-post surplus, which in turn is important for surplus extraction by the principal and investment by the agent. Finally, I suppose that the external party with whom the principal can alternatively deal receives no surplus. This would be consistent, for instance, with a case of competition among many external parties who are willing to deal with the principal in the event she does not trade with the agent. An implicit assumption in the model is that the agent gains some bargaining power during the relationship. This corresponds to situations where by investing in preparation for trade or by direct contact with the principal, the agent learns more about the principal (e.g., about technology employed, …nancial position, negotiation strategies) leaving him in a better position in future negotiations.
In the analysis that follows, the equilibrium concept used is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). 8 2.1. Post-Renegotiation Payo¤s, Expected Payo¤s and Agent' s Investment. At the renegotiation stage, the principal and agent receive one half of the renegotiation surplus in addition to their disagreement payo¤s. The disagreement payo¤s of the principal and agent are the payo¤s in the event they do not reach a renegotiation agreement and the initial contract is executed. The renegotiation surplus is the di¤erence between the e¢ cient total surplus and the sum of the disagreement payo¤s. Since the disagreement payo¤s (ignoring sunk investment costs) are qv A t for the agent and qv P + (1 q)(1 e)V E + t for the principal, and the e¢ cient total surplus (also ignoring sunk investment costs) is maxfV; V E g, the agent's post-renegotiation payo¤ given contract c = (t; q; e) and (a; v A ; v P ; V E ) is intangible form, such as human capital investment. In these cases, it is di¢ cult to contract on investmentrelated information. 7 The assumption that the principal and the agent have equal bargaining shares at the renegotiation stage is not crucial. All the results remain unchanged if instead of 1/2 we consider that the agent's bargaining share is 2 (0; 1). The important assumption is that the agent has some (strictly positive) bargaining power at the renegotiation stage. Otherwise, his payo¤ would not depend on the private information of the principal, in which case there is no need for the principal to signal her private information to be able to extract surplus from the agent. 8 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a precise de…nition of a PBE.
given by
Similarly, the principal's post-renegotiation payo¤ can be written as (2) u P (c; ) = 1 2 maxfV;
E¢ cient renegotiation implies that the sum of the payo¤s to principal and agent is always equal to e¢ cient total surplus (hereinafter, total surplus), i.e., u A (c; ) + u P (c; ) = s( ), for all c and , where s( ) = maxfV; V E g (a). Since the analysis will focus on the equilibrium of the contracting game between the principal and the agent, which occurs before uncertainty is resolved, it is convenient to obtain their ex-ante expected payo¤s. The expected payo¤s of the principal and agent are both functions of the contract c and the agent's investment level a. However, since at the contracting and investment stages the principal knows and the agent does not, the expected payo¤ of the principal is a direct function of , while the expected payo¤ of the agent is a function of his beliefs about . More speci…cally, expected payo¤s are given by
where b H 2 [0; 1] represents the agent's belief that = H . With a slight abuse of notation, U A (c; a j 0) and U A (c; a j 1) will be frequently denoted by U A (c; a j L ) and U A (c; a j H ), respectively.
The expected total surplus given investment a and state is denoted by S(a; ) E[s( ) j a; ]. From the fact that u A (c; ) + u P (c; ) = s( ) for all c and , it follows that for any 2 and a 2 A,
This property of the expected payo¤s will be extensively used in the analysis of the equilibrium outcomes.
The …rst-best level of investment given state j , denoted by a 0 j , is the investment that maximizes total expected surplus, i.e., The agent's investment decision, denoted by a (c; b H ), is the investment level that maximizes his expected payo¤ given contract c and beliefs b H , i.e.,
It is assumed that S(a; ) and U A (c; a j ) are concave in a for all 2 , and that both a 0 j and a (c; b H ) are interior to A. It is also assumed that S(a; ) is di¤erentiable in a and U A (c; a j ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable in a for all 2 . I begin the analysis by showing that when the principal has no private information about her value of trade with the external parties V E , then contracting on exclusivity does not expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. More speci…cally, I show that for any equilibrium when the contract space is C = R Q E, there is an equilibrium with identical expected payo¤s and identical agent investment when the contract space is C 0 = R Q f0g. For future reference, equilibria satisfying this property are called outcome equivalent.
This result is established here for expositional convenience. Speci…cally, because it will be useful in the next section and because it holds regardless of the way in which the agent's investment a and the state a¤ect the distribution of internal values v A and v P -e¤ects about which I will be more speci…c further on. Hereinafter, let F V E (: j ) denote the marginal cumulative distribution function of V E given state . 10 Proposition 1 (Irrelevance Result). Suppose that the principal's private information does not include information about the principal's value of trade with external parties, i.e.,
Then, exclusivity has no e¤ ect on the set of equilibrium outcomes: for any equilibrium when the contract space is C = R Q E, there is an outcome equivalent equilibrium when the contract space is C 0 = R Q f0g:
There are two crucial points in understanding this result. First, since investment a¤ects internal values only, there is no cross e¤ect between investment and exclusivity in the payo¤ functions. This implies that exclusivity has no direct e¤ect on the agent's investment decision. Second, since information is only about internal values, there is also no cross e¤ect between exclusivity and private information in the expected payo¤ functions of the principal and the agent. In other words, the expected payo¤s of the principal and the agent do not satisfy the single crossing property with respect to exclusivity. Thus, for given beliefs, the principal can exchange exclusivity by up-front transfer in the contract and still generate the same expected payo¤s and the same agent's investment decision.
The irrelevance result in this section extends that in Segal and Whinston (2000) to a setting with asymmetric information. In that paper, the authors show that exclusivity has no e¤ect on investment decisions when investment a¤ects only internal values. Proposition 1 implies 9 Concavity of S(a; ) and UA(c; a j ) in a ensures that a (c; bH ) and a 0 j are unique. Di¤erentiability of S(a; ) and UA(c; a j ) in a and the fact that a (c; bH ) and a 0 j are interior to A imply that a (c; bH ) and a 0 j are characterized by the usual …rst-order conditions. Finally, the fact that UA(c; a j ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable in a ensures that a (c; bH ) changes smoothly with the contractual variables. 10 The agent's investment does not a¤ect this distribution because it is a relationship-speci…c investment.
not only that exclusivity has no e¤ect on investment decisions when investment a¤ects only internal values, but also that exclusivity has no e¤ect on surplus extraction (through signalling information) when private information is only about values internal to the relationship.
Contractual Signalling and Relationship-Specific Investment
In this section, I characterize equilibrium contracting between the principal and the agent and equilibrium agent's investment. As a consequence of ex-post renegotiation, trade is always e¢ cient. This is because the levels of trade and exclusivity prescribed in the initial contract can always be changed (without cost) to their e¢ cient levels after uncertainty about valuations has vanished. This holds regardless of the contract agreed on by the principal and the agent at the initial contracting stage. In contrast, the agent's investment decision is irreversible at the renegotiation stage. Hence, e¢ ciency of investment is not ensured by renegotiation. In fact, it is because of ex-post renegotiation that a problem of hold-up in investment emerges.
The literature on the hold-up problem with symmetric information at the contracting stage shows that the ine¢ ciency of investment can be resolved (or mitigated) if parties choose a contract that provides the right incentives to invest. In our setting, because of asymmetry of information, the principal uses the contract not only to provide incentives to invest, but also to signal information to the agent in order to extract surplus. As we shall see below, these two roles of contracting can con ‡ict with one another.
I …rst analyze, as a benchmark, the case of contracting under symmetric information. I then consider the case in which quantity is contractible, but not exclusivity. Finally, I analyze the case in which both quantity and exclusivity are contractible. By comparing these two last cases, one obtains that in contrast to the result in the previous section, contractibility of exclusivity a¤ects equilibrium outcomes and the e¢ ciency of investment when the principal's private information is about the value of her outside option.
Before proceeding the analysis, some more structure about the nature of both the principal's private information and the agent's investment is introduced.
Agent Investment and Information Specifications. In the reminder of the paper it is assumed that the agent's investment a¤ects only his value of trade with the principal. Speci…cally, that this value of trade is given by the non-stochastic increasing function v A (a). This type of investment as been referred in the literature as sel…sh investment.
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Regarding information, the following two forms of the principal's private information are considered: 11 Concentrating on the case of sel…sh investment, as opposed to the case of cooperative investment (i.e., a a¤ects both the principal and the agent's valuations), allows us to better assess the e¤ect of asymmetry of information at the contracting stage on e¢ ciency of investment. In contrast with the case of sel…sh investment, a contract ensuring e¢ cient cooperative investment may not exist even when information is symmetric at the contracting stage (see for example Che and Hausch, 1999 For simplicity of exposition, it is assumed that there is ex-ante uncertainty only about the trade valuation about which the principal has private information. Thus, when the principal's private information is about v P (resp. V E ) only the trade valuation v P (resp. V E ) is uncertain ex-ante. All the results in the paper continue to hold if this assumption is relaxed.
A notion that will be useful in the remainder of the paper is that of probability of success of the relationship. This is the ex-ante probability that the principal and the agent trade. E¢ ciency of ex-post renegotiation implies that if trade between the principal and an external party creates more value than trade between the principal and the agent, the principal and the agent agree not to trade with each other. Thus, the probability of success of the relationship is the ex-ante probability that the value of trade V (a) v A (a) + v P is greater than the value of trade V E . Because this probability depends on both the agent's investment a and the state , it is denoted by P s (a; ).
Given the above agent's investment and information speci…cations, we can further characterize the probability of success of the relationship, the agent's investment decision and the way the agent's investment a¤ects the principal's expected payo¤. For future convenience, this is done here.
The probability of success of the relationship. The probability of success of the relationship P s (a; ) is always bigger in state H than it is in state L , for each level of investment a. That is,
Furthermore, from the fact that v A (a) is an increasing function of a, it follows that P s (a; ) is increasing in a for all 2 .
Agent's investment decision. Given contract c and belief b H , the agent chooses investment so as to maximize his expected payo¤ U A (c; a j b H ). Under the above investment and information speci…cations
The agent's optimal investment is characterized by the …rst-order condition
From (6), one obtains that the agent's investment decision depends on contract c only through quantity q. Thus, henceforth I use a (c; b H ) and a (q; b H ) interchangeably. Moreover, since P s (a; H ) P s (a; L ) for all a 2 A, the agent's investment is increasing in his belief b H . Intuitively, agents who believe that the trade relationship with the principal is more likely to succeed are willing to invest more in it. Finally, note that the agent's investment decision increases with the contracted quantity q. Intuitively, when facing a contract specifying a high quantity level, the agent knows that with high probability his disagreement payo¤ at the renegotiation stage will be his value of trade with the principal v A (a). Therefore, in that case, his incentives to invest are also high in order to protect his disagreement payo¤.
I summarize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The agent's investment decision a (q; b H ) is increasing with contracted quantity q and with beliefs b H .
Agent's investment and principal's payo¤ . Although the agent's investment does not a¤ect the principal's value of trade with the agent v P , it a¤ects her expected payo¤:
In fact, it does so through two di¤erent channels: by a¤ecting the total surplus (the …rst term in (7)), which is a positive e¤ect; and by a¤ecting the agent's disagreement payo¤ ( qv A (a) in the second term in (7)), which is a negative e¤ect. Di¤erentiating U P (c; a j ) with respect to a, we obtain
Therefore, which of the e¤ects is the dominant depends on the relative values of the contracted quantity q and the probability of success of the relationship P s (a; ). In particular, when contracted quantity is zero, the "total surplus e¤ect"dominates, and therefore the principal's payo¤ is increasing with investment. When contracted quantity is one, the reverse occurs. Finally, note from (8) that the principal's payo¤ responds more positively to investment when the probability of success of the relationship is high. For future convenience, I state this result in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The expected payo¤ of the principal is supermodular in ( ; a). Speci…cally, for all a 1 ; a 2 2 A such that a 2 a 1 and for all c 2 C;
4.1. A Benchmark Case: Symmetric Information Contracting. Suppose that both the principal and the agent know at the contracting and investment stages. In this symmetric information environment, the contracting problem faced by the principal consists of choosing the contract that maximizes her expected payo¤ taking into account the individual rationality constraint and the investment decision of the agent, i.e., given the principal solves max c;a
Because U P (c; a j ) = U P (0; q; e; a j ) + t and U A (c; a j ) = U A (0; q; e; a j ) t for all c 2 C, a 2 A and 2 , constraint (i) must bind in any solution to this problem. Moreover, since ex-post renegotiation implies that U P (c; a j ) + U A (c; a j ) = S(a; ), the principal's problem can be rewritten as max q;e;a S(a; ) (9) s.t. a 2 arg max a 0 2A U A (0; q; e; a 0 j ) Hence, the principal always proposes the contract that induces the agent to invest as e¢ ciently as possible and uses the transfer t to extract all the surplus from the agent. We shall see that this contrasts with the asymmetric information environment where, when choosing the contract, the principal also takes into account the need to signal her type in order to extract surplus.
The …rst-best level of investment is implementable in the case of symmetric information. Note that, the …rst-best investment a 0 j associated with state j solves
Because S(a; ) is di¤erentiable in a and the …rst-best investment is interior, a 0 j satis…es the …rst-order condition
In a similar way, from (6) we obtain that the agent's investment a when he knows state with certainty satis…es the …rst-order condition
Comparing (10) and (11), we obtain that the principal can induce the agent to invest the …rst-best investment in state j by choosing
i.e., by setting in state j the contracted quantity equal to the probability of success of the relationship evaluated at the …rst-best investment a 0 j . Thus, when information is symmetric, investment is e¢ cient in equilibrium (…rst-best) and the principal receives the …rst-best total expected surplus S(a 0 j ; j ), for all j 2 fL; Hg. I next come back to the case of the principal with private information and characterize equilibrium. In this case, surplus extraction by the principal is more di¢ cult than when information is symmetric because the principal needs to signal her information. I start by analyzing the case where quantity is contractible, but not exclusivity. I then compare it with the case where both quantity and exclusivity are contractible. 4.2. Quantity Contracts. Let us focus …rst on the case of quantity contracts. Suppose that E = f0g, meaning that exclusivity is not contractible. Thus, a contract is a transfer-quantity pair, i.e., c = (t; q). These contracts are often referred to as speci…c performance contracts. The analysis and results in this section hold for both the case of private information about v P and that of private information about V E . The main purpose here is to characterize equilibria and to show the existence of ine¢ cient equilibria in terms of investment. I proceed as follows. I …rst de…ne and characterize a speci…c type of allocation-the best separating allocation. I then use it to characterize equilibria.
Formally
where L = 0 and H = 1. That is, each type of principal maximizes (in independent maximizations) her own payo¤ within the set of menus that are incentive compatible for the principal, and regardless of the principal's type, yield the agent a non-negative payo¤. Note two things. First, incentive compatibility depends on the agent's investment decisions following the principal's choice of contract c in m = fc L ; c H g, which in turn depends on the agent's beliefs. In the de…nition of the best separating allocation we implicitly assume that the agent's beliefs are: b H = 0 after observing contract choice c L and b H = 1 after observing contract choice c H (hereinafter, separating beliefs). Second, a best separating allocation is itself incentive compatible given these separating beliefs. These two facts have two implications. First, although obtaining the best separating allocation involves performing two independent maximizations (one for the principal of type L and another one for the principal of type H ), the best separating allocation b m = fb c L ; b c H g solves problem 12 for both types. Second, following the proposal of a best separating allocation b m = fb c L ; b c H g by the principal, there is always a continuation equilibrium in which the agent accepts the proposal and the principal of type j chooses contract b c j from b m, for all j 2 fL; Hg. These two properties will be used below to obtain the best separating allocation and to characterize equilibrium contracting and investment.
In the rest of the paper, I impose the following condition.
This condition holds whenever q
, where x(q; bH ) is the quantity level for which the expected payo¤s of the agent in both states L and H , given investment a (q; bH ), are the same, i.e., x(q; bH ) : UA(0; x(q; bH ); a (q; bH ) j L) = UA(0; x(q; bH ); a (q; bH ) j H ).
Condition 1 allows us to concentrate our attention on the payo¤s in state H . As we will see below, this condition has two implications. First, the payo¤ of the principal in state L associated with the best separating allocation is the …rst-best total surplus S(a 0 L ; L ). Second, in state L the principal can ensure herself at least S(a 0 L ; L ), regardless of the agent's beliefs. I now characterize the best separating allocation. I start by analyzing the payo¤ of the principal of type L and the contract b c L associated with it.
Lemma 3. The payo¤ of the principal of type L associated with the best separating allocation is
Proof. See Appendix B.
Under Condition 1, given the separating beliefs, it is always possible to construct an incentive compatible menu of contracts satisfying the agent's individual rationality constraint in both states L and H , which leaves the principal of type L with the …rst-best total surplus S(a 0 L ; L ). The only contract compatible with the principal's payo¤ S(a 0 L ; L ) and non-negativity of the agent's expected payo¤ given state L , is the contract that speci…es q L = q 0 L and transfer t L such that the principal extracts all the surplus from the agent in state L (i.e., IR( L ) binds). 13 Thus, in the best separating allocation, this is the contract associated with the principal of type L . Next, I analyze the payo¤ of the principal of type H and the contract b c H associated with the best separating allocation. Given Lemma 3 and the observation that the best separating allocation fb c L ; ; b c H g has the property that it solves (12) for both types of principal, we can restrict without loss of generality to menus of the type fb c L ; c H g when solving for (12) for the principal of type H . Thus, …nding contract b c H and the payo¤ of the principal of type H associated with the best separating allocation consists of …nding the contract c H = (t H ; q H ) that solves Problem 2.
Problem 2 consists of …nding the contract that maximizes the payo¤ of the principal in state H ; assuming that the agent knows the true state of the world (due to separation, the agent correctly infers from the principal's contract choice). The …rst two constraints, the usual IC constraints, impose that each type of principal prefers not to deviate and mimic the 13 Observe that, given state L, if the principal's payo¤ equals the …rst-best total surplus, then the agent's payo¤ is non-negative only if investment is e¢ cient, i.e., a other type; otherwise separation would not occur. Constraint (iii), the IR( H ) constraint, imposes that the payo¤ of the agent who knows that the state is H cannot be lower than his reservation value. For each quantity level q H , constraints IC( L ) and IR( H ) impose an upper bound on the value of the up-front transfer t H : Deriving the solution to Problem 2 o¤ers important insights regarding the crucial e¤ects leading to the existence of ine¢ cient equilibria, and we shall do so here.
In any solution to Problem 2, at least one of the constraints IC( L ) or IR( H ) is binding.
14 Suppose that this were not the case; then it would be possible to increase t H by an arbitrarily small amount > 0 and still have all the constraints in the problem satis…ed (including IC( H )) while increasing the objective function, which would be a contradiction. Let us now be more speci…c about which of the constraints IC( L ) or IR( H ) is binding. There are two possible cases, which I consider separately. Case 1: The binding constraint when q H = q 0 H is IR( H ). This case is depicted in Figure 2 . When IR( H ) is the binding constraint at q H = q 0 H , …rst-best investment and full surplus extraction in both states L and H is incentive compatible. Therefore, the solution to Problem 2 involves q H = q 0 H and t H such that IR( H ) binds. This implies that the payo¤ of the principal of type H associated with the best separating allocation is the …rst-best total surplus in state H , S(a 0 H ; H ), and b c H = ( b t H ; q 0 H ) where b t H = U A (0; q 0 H ; a (q 0 H ; 1) j H ). In this case, there is no con ‡ict between surplus extraction and e¢ ciency: the best separating allocation is characterized by full surplus extraction and full e¢ ciency in terms of the agent's investment decision. Case 2: The binding constraint when q H = q 0 H is IC( L ). This case is depicted in Figure 3 . To study the solution to Problem 2 in this case, I …rst analyze which constraint is binding for q H 2 [q 0 H ; 1].
14 Usually in this type of problem constraint IC( H ) is not binding. Therefore, it is omitted during the determination of the solution to the problem and checked to be satis…ed ex-post. I do this in Appendix A (see Lemma 7) . 
Proof. See Appendix B.
Obtaining the solution to Problem 2 involves determining how the expected payo¤ of the principal of type H (the objective function) evolves with q H along the relevant binding constraint.
For q H > q, the binding constraint is IR( H ), so there is full surplus extraction and the payo¤ of the principal is given by S(a (q H ; 1); H ). Observe that the expected total surplus S(a (q H ; 1); H ) reaches its maximum value at q H = q 0 H , since a (q 0 H ; 1) = a 0 H , which is the …rst-best investment in state H . Therefore, from concavity of S(a; H ) in investment a and the fact that the agent's investment decision a (q H ; 1) is increasing in q H , it follows that S(a (q H ; 1); H ) decreases in q H for q H q (recall that0 H ). Thus, the payo¤ of the principal type H decreases with q H in the interval [q; 1] and therefore a solution to Problem 2 must satisfy q H q.
For q H 2 [q 0 H ; q], the binding constraint is IC( L ). To study how the expected payo¤ of the principal of type H evolves with q H along the constraint IC( L ), let m(q H ) denote the function obtained by substituting t H in the expected payo¤ of the principal of type H by its value when constraint IC( L ) is binding, i.e.,
Di¤erentiating it with respect to q H , we obtain
Changing q H has a direct e¤ect, which is given by the …rst term, and an indirect e¤ect through investment that corresponds to the second term. The …rst term, which is equal to
in the case of private information about v P , and to
in the case of private information about V E , represents the direct surplus extraction e¤ ect: by increasing q H , the principal of type H can also increase the up-front transfer t H in a way that IC( L ) continues to be satis…ed and her total payo¤ increases. This e¤ect stems from the fact that when holding the agent's investment …xed, the principal's expected payo¤ exhibits the single crossing property with respect to transfer and quantity, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between transfer and quantity is bigger for the principal of type H than it is for the principal of type L . The second term, which represents the indirect investment e¤ ect, is equal to
and is also positive since @a (q H ; 1)=@q H 0 (see Lemma 1) and P s (a; H ) P s (a; L ) for all a 2 A. Intuitively, the investment e¤ect is positive because the payo¤ of the principal of type H is more sensitive to relationship-speci…c investment than the payo¤ of the principal of type L . Therefore, it is the principal of type H who gains more by increasing quantity and inducing the agent to invest more.
Since the direct surplus extraction e¤ect and the indirect investment e¤ect are both positive, the expected payo¤ of the principal of type H increases with contracted quantity when moving along the IC( L ) constraint. This result, together with the fact that that payo¤ decreases with contracted quantity when moving along IR( H ) when q H > q, implies that the solution to Problem 2 is given by q H = q. 15 Hence, in this case, the contract of the principal of type H associated with the best separating allocation is b c H = ( b t H ; q), where b t H is such that IR( H ) binds. The payo¤ of the principal associated with this contract is S(a (q; 1); H ) < S(a 0 H ; H ). In contrast to Case 1, in this case the outcome associated with the best separating allocation is ine¢ cient in terms of investment: in order to signal information to extract surplus, the principal sets an excessively high quantity (q > q 0 H ), leading the agent to overinvest in the relationship. This completes the derivation of the best separating allocation. I now proceed to the characterization of equilibrium outcomes.
As argued above, following the proposal of a best separating allocation b m = fb c L ; b c H g by the principal, there is a continuation equilibrium in which the agent accepts the principal's proposal and then the principal chooses contract b c L if she is of type L and contract b c H 15 Since the expected payo¤ of the principal of type H increases with quantity when moving along the IC( L) constraint, the solution to Problem 2 cannot involve a contract specifying a quantity smaller than q 0 H . if she is of type H . Hence, the remaining question is whether both types of principal proposing b m = fb c L ; b c H g followed by this separating continuation equilibrium constitutes an equilibrium of the overall game, i.e., whether there exist beliefs and continuation equilibria o¤-the-equilibrium path such that no type of principal gains by deviating and proposing a menu m 0 6 = b m. The next proposition clari…es this question. In what follows, let M denote the set of …nite menus of contracts and b U P ( L ) and b U P ( H ) denote the principal's payo¤s-derived above-associated with the best separating allocation.
Proposition 2. If both types of principal propose a menu m 2 M , followed by a continuation equilibrium (after menu proposal) in which the principal's payo¤ s e U P ( L ) and e U P ( H ) are such that e U P ( j ) b U P ( j ) for all j 2 fL; Hg, then there are o¤ -the-equilibrium path beliefs such that this proposal and continuation equilibrium constitutes an equilibrium outcome of the overall game.
Proposition 2 provides su¢ cient conditions for an equilibrium. Speci…cally, it ensures that both types of principal proposing a menu of contracts m, followed by a continuation equilibrium (after the menu proposal) in which the principal's payo¤s Pareto dominate the payo¤s associated with the best separating allocation constitutes an equilibrium.
An implication of Proposition 2 is that both types of principal proposing the best separating allocation, followed by the respective separating continuation equilibrium, always constitutes an equilibrium of the game. In particular, Proposition 2 establishes that ine¢ cient equilibria exist. Among these are those in which the principal of type H distorts the contracted quantity (relative to q 0 H , which is the quantity that induces the agent to invest e¢ ciently in state H ) in order to extract more surplus from the agent.
This result is important not only because of the speci…c e¢ ciency implications that it has, but also because it emphasizes that surplus extraction and e¢ ciency of investment can in fact con ‡ict with one another when parties contract under asymmetric information. I next allow exclusivity to be contractible and investigate its role in mitigating this con ‡ict.
4.3.
Quantity and Exclusivity Contracts. Suppose now that both quantity and exclusivity are contractible, i.e., Q = E = [0; 1]. In this case, a contract is triple c = (t; q; e). Because of the irrelevance result of Proposition 1, contractibility of exclusivity does a¤ect the set of equilibrium outcomes when the principal's private information is about v P . Thus, in this section only the case where the principal's private information is about the external value V E is considered.
To characterize the equilibrium allocations and payo¤s, I start by presenting in Lemma 5 lower bounds for the principal's equilibrium payo¤s. Then, in Proposition 3, I present the equilibrium payo¤s themselves and characterize equilibrium investments.
Lemma 5. Suppose that quantity and exclusivity are contractible (Q = E = [0; 1]). Then, in any equilibrium, the payo¤ of the principal of type j is at least the …rst-best expected total surplus S(a 0 j ; j ), for all j 2 fL; Hg.
Contractibility of exclusivity plays no role in ensuring to the principal of type L the …rst-best total surplus S(a 0 L ; L ). Under Condition 1, the principal of type L always achieves this payo¤ even if exclusivity is not contractible. In contrast, in the case of the principal of type H , it is the fact that exclusivity is contractible that allows the principal to construct a contract that guarantees her the …rst-best total surplus S(a 0 H ; H ). Note that, we have just seen in the previous section that when exclusivity is not contractible, there exist equilibria in which the payo¤ of the principal of type H is S(a (q; 1); H ) < S(a 0 H ; H ). To illustrate the role of exclusivity when the principal is of type H , consider the expected payo¤ of the agent given contract (t = 0; q; e), state and investment a. In the case of private information about the external value V E , this payo¤ can be written as
When the contract prescribes full exclusivity, i.e., e = 1, the agent's expected payo¤ is a¤ected by only through the term
Therefore, from the fact that the distribution of the external value V E in state L …rst-order stochastically dominates that in state H , it follows that (13) U A (0; q; e = 1; a j L ) U A (0; q; e = 1; a j H ) for all a 2 A:
Intuitively, when the principal promises full exclusivity, the agent is better o¤ when the principal has a high outside option (state L ), since he can appropriate part of it at the renegotiation stage by threatening to enforce the contract and prevent the principal from trading with third parties: From (13), it follows that the agent's expected payo¤ U A (0; q; e = 1; a (q; b H ) j b H ) is decreasing in his belief b H , for any given quantity q. In particular, this holds for q = q 0 H . This implies that regardless of the agent's beliefs, he always accepts contract (t; q 0 H ; e = 1) in which t = U A (0; q 0 H ; 1; a (q 0 H ; 1) j H ), i.e., his expected payo¤ when his beliefs are b H = 1 (his worst possible payo¤ across beliefs). Hence, exclusivity allows the principal to construct a contract in which the agent is better o¤ in state L than in state H : This is also possible when exclusivity is not contractible if the principal sets a su¢ ciently high quantity in the contract. The problem in doing so, however, is that she distorts the agent's investment decision.
Now I turn to the question of equilibrium payo¤s and investments. Then, in any equilibrium, investment levels are e¢ cient (…rst-best in both states) and the principal always appropriates the …rst-best total surplus, i.e., the equilibrium payo¤ of the principal in state j is S(a 0 j ; j ) for all j 2 fL; Hg.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium and let e U P ( j ) denote the principal's payo¤ in state j in that equilibrium. Lemma 5 implies that e U P ( j ) S(a 0 j ; j ) for all j 2 fL; Hg. Individual rationality of the agent implies that it is not possible that e U P ( j ) S(a 0 j ; j ) for all j 2 fL; Hg and, simultaneously, e U P ( j ) > S(a 0 j ; j ) for some j 2 fL; Hg. The two preceding results imply that e U P ( j ) = S(a 0 j ; j ) for all j 2 fL; Hg. From individual rationality of the agent and the fact that e U P ( j ) = S(a 0 j ; j ) for all j 2 fL; Hg, it follows that investment must be e¢ cient (…rst-best) in both states L and H . Proposition 3 establishes that in any equilibrium of the game when the principal can contractually use both quantity and exclusivity, the investment levels are e¢ cient in both states L and H . To illustrate why e¢ ciency is always obtained when both quantity and exclusivity are contractible (as opposed to the case when only quantity is contractible), consider the derivation of the best separating allocation in Case 2 presented in the previous section (see Figure 3) . Recall that, in that case, investment is ine¢ cient due to the fact that the principal sets an excessively high quantity (q > q 0 H ) in order to extract more surplus from the agent. When exclusivity is contractible, instead of increasing quantity above q 0 H , which induces the agent to overinvest in the relationship, the principal can set quantity q 0 H and use (increase) exclusivity to move along the IC( L ) constraint, signal her type and extract surplus from the agent. Surplus extraction can be achieved in this way because the direct surplus extraction e¤ect associated with exclusivity is positive when the source of private information is the external. Moreover, exclusivity does not directly a¤ect the agent's investment decision, implying that surplus extraction through exclusivity does not interfere with provision of investment incentives.
The preceding analysis shows that, in contrast with the case of private information about internal values (Section 3), contractibility of exclusivity has important implications when private information is about external values. In particular, it shows that the ability to contractually use exclusive provisions eliminates ine¢ cient equilibria that may otherwise exist. I have therefore identi…ed a situation in which contractibility of exclusivity enhances e¢ ciency.
Conclusion
The literature on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem has focused on situations where the parties to the contract have symmetric information when contracting about future transactions. In this paper, I depart from this literature by examining a situation in which the party that designs the contract at the contracting phase has relevant private information. I show that because of information concerns, the contract designer may distort the contract's terms relative to those that induce e¢ cient investment so as to signal information and appropriate more of the surplus generated. I also show that when private information concerns the value of trade with external parties, the ability to include exclusive clauses in the contract plays an important role in eliminating these distortions and, consequently, the ine¢ ciency of investment.
Regarding the literature on the e¤ect of exclusive contracts on relationship-speci…c investment, the analysis in this paper complements that in Segal and Whinston (2000) and De Meza and Selvaggi (2007). Following a cooperative approach to model renegotiation, Segal and Whinston (2000) show that renegotiable exclusivity contracts have no e¤ect on relationship-speci…c investment. De Meza and Selvaggi (2007) point out that if the bargaining solution to renegotiation is non-cooperative, exclusivity may a¤ect relationship-speci…c investments. The present paper contributes to this literature by providing a novel channel through which exclusive agreements a¤ect relationship-speci…c investments. Concretely, because exclusivity signals information, it helps to mitigate the con ‡ict between signalling information and providing incentives to invest that is present when parties contract under asymmetric information.
On a more practical level, this paper o¤ers an explanation as to why contracts often specify simultaneously both a quantity to be traded in the future and an exclusivity clause. It also o¤ers an explanation as to why …rms voluntarily bind themselves by committing to trade exclusively with another …rm. Furthermore, the e¤ect of exclusivity that I highlight here may be important for policy design. The major (and unsettled) debate on that front is on whether exclusive agreements serve anticompetitive purposes and, as a consequence, on whether they should be contractually allowed. By showing that contractibility of exclusivity may enhance e¢ ciency of investment, this paper suggests that a policy that systematically prohibits exclusive contacts may be misguided. (12) for the principal of type L . First, because fb c L ; c H g must satisfy the IC( H ) constraint in the problem, we obtain that
Second, because the constraints of the problem presented in (12) are exactly the same whether we are solving it for the principal of type L or for the principal of type H , fb c L ; c H g is also a feasible menu in the problem for the principal of type H . This immediately implies that
From this inequality and the fact shown above that
Lemma 6. Both when private information is about v P and when private information is about V E , U A (t; q = 1; e = 0; a j L ) U A (t; q = 1; e = 0; a j H ) for all t 2 R and all a 2 A:
Proof. By taking expectations of (1), we obtain that
Because does not a¤ect v A (a), we obtain that U A (t; q = 1; e = 0; a j L ) U A (t; q = 1; e = 0; a j H ) if and only if
When private information is about v P , (14) follows directly from the fact that maxfV (a); V E g v P is a decreasing function of v P and (14) follows directly from the fact that maxfV (a); V E g v P is an increasing function of V E and
Lemma 7. The proposed solution to Problem 2 (ignoring constraint IC( H )), i.e., con- Proof. I …rst prove the result for Case 1, i.e., that
The result is established by noting that
where: (i) the …rst equality follows from the fact that U P (t; q; a j ) = U P (0; q; a j ) + t for all q 2 [0; 1], a 2 A and t 2 R; (ii) the …rst inequality follows from Condition 1; (iii) the second equality from (3); (iv) the second inequality from the fact that a 0 H is the investment level that maximizes S(a; H ); and (v) the last equality from (3) again.
I now prove the result for Case 2, i.e., that
q; a (q; 1) j H ). I do this by comparing both
, where e c H = ( e t H ; q 0 L ) with e t H such that e c H satis…es constraint IC( L ) of Problem 2 with equality.
Because the expected payo¤ of the principal of type H increases when moving along the IC( L ) constraint by increasing quantity q (see the derivation of the solution to Problem 2 in Section 4.3) and contract b c H = (q; b t H ) (where q > q 0 L ) also satis…es constraint IC( L ) with equality, we obtain that
with U P (e c H ; a (e c H ; 1) j H ). By construction, e c H satis…es constraint IC( L ) with equality. Thus U P (e c H ; a (e c H ; 1)
This means that b t L e t H is identical to the incremental payo¤ to the principal of type L associated with an increase in investment from a (q 0
which is equivalent to
From (16) and (15) 
Lemma 8. Suppose that IC( L ) is the binding constraint in Problem 2 when q = q 0 H (Case 2). If a contract c = (t; q) satis…es simultaneously
Proof. Given a contract c = (t; q), conditions U P (c; a (c; 0) j L ) S(a 0 L ; L ) and U P (c; a (c; 0) j H ) > S(a (q; 1); H ) are equivalent to (17) S(a (q; 1);
Therefore, they hold simultaneously only if in (17) the term on the right side of t is greater than that on the left side. That is, only if
Since by Lemma 2 the right-hand side of (18) is an increasing function of q, it su¢ ces to show that condition (18) is not satis…ed when q = q. To obtain this, note that
where: (i) the …rst equality is obtained by using the fact that S(a (q; 1); H ) = U P (0; q; a (q; 1) j H )+U A (0; q; a (q; 1) j H ) and the fact the incentive compatibility of type L is binding in the best separating allocation, i.e., S(a 0 L ; L ) = U P (0; q; a (q; 1) j L )+U A (0; q; a (q; 1) j H ); and (ii) the inequality follows from the fact that U P (0; q; a (q;
is an increasing function of b H , which is an implication of Lemma 2: This completes the proof of the Lemma.
B. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas in the Main Text
Proof. (of Proposition 1) Using the fact that investment and information a¤ect only internal values, the expected payo¤s of the principal and the agent, given contract c = (t; q; e) and agent's beliefs b H , can be written as:
where a (c; b H ) is as de…ned in (4) . Notice that the agent's payo¤ from investment is additively separable from both the exclusivity term e and the transfer t. Thus, the agent's investment decision does not depend on e and t, so instead of a (c; b H ) we can simply write a (q; b H ). From this observation and direct inspection of (19) and (20), we obtain that for the same beliefs b H , contracts c = (t; q; e) and c 0 (c) = (t 0 ; q 0 ; 0) 2 C 0 with t 0 = t 1 2 (1 q)eE[V E ] and q 0 = q, generate the same expected payo¤s to the principal (in both states L and H ) and agent, as well as the same agent's investment decision.
I now show how to construct, for each equilibrium when the contract space is C, an outcome equivalent equilibrium when the contract space is C 0 . Consider an equilibrium when the contract space is C: For each menu of contracts m = fc 1 ; :::; c n(m) g chosen with positive probability by the principal in this equilibrium, construct a corresponding menu m 0 (m) of contracts in C 0 in the following way: m 0 (m) = fc 0 (c 1 ); ::; c 0 (c n(m) )g. Let M 0 denote the set of menus constructed in this way. 16 Now, consider the following strategies when the contract space is C 0 : In each of the states in , the principal chooses menu m 0 (m) 2 M 0 with the same probability that she chooses menu m in the equilibrium when the contract space is C. Moreover, in each of the states in , and for each menu m 0 (m) 2 M 0 , the principal chooses contract c 0 (c j ) 2 m 0 (m) with the same probability that she chooses contract c j 2 m in the equilibrium when the contract space is C. In a similar way, upon observing menu m 0 (m) 2 M 0 proposal and contract c 0 (c j ) choice by the principal, the agent's actions and beliefs are the same as after observing menu m proposal and contract c j choice by the principal in the equilibrium when C is the contract space. Menus m = 2 M 0 are not chosen by the principal and therefore are o¤-the-equilibrium path. For all menus o¤-the-equilibrium path, let the actions of both the principal and the agent and the beliefs of the agent be the same as in the initial equilibrium when C is the contract space. Since, contracts c and c 0 (c) are outcome equivalent given the same beliefs and C 0 C, if the initial strategies constitute an equilibrium when C is the contract space, then these strategies also constitute an equilibrium when C 0 is the contract space. Moreover, the two equilibria are outcome equivalent.
Proof. (of Lemma 3) I start by showing that there exists an allocation fc L ; c H g, satisfying the constraints of problem (12) 
is satis…ed with equality; and where t H is such that
i.e., IC( H ) is satis…ed with equality. By (3) (e¢ cient ex-post renegotiation), the fact that
. Hence, it remains only to show that fb c L ; c H g also satis…es constraints IC( L ) and IR( H ).
. Because U P (t; q; a j ) = U P (0; q; a j ) + t for all q 2 [0; 1], a 2 A and 16 We implicitly consider that the speci…c placement of contracts within a menu distinguishes contracts that are otherwise identical, and that when constructing M 0 irrelevant contracts (e.g., contracts specifying a very low transfer such that they are never chosen by the principal) may be introduced in menus whenever necessary to di¤erentiate between identical menus.
Thus, b t L e t H is identical to the incremental payo¤ to the principal of type H associated with an increase in investment from a (q 0
where: (i) the …rst equality follows from the fact that U A (t; q; a j ) = U A (0; q; a j ) t for all q 2 [0; 1], a 2 A and t 2 R; and (ii) the second equality from (22) and the fact that
Thus, the term in curly brackets in (23) is always positive. I next show that the term in square brackets is also positive. The derivative of U P ( 0; q 0 L ; a H ) with respect to a is
The fact that, for all a 2 A, P s (a; H ) P s (a; L ) and P s (a; L ) is increasing in a, implies that
is increasing in a. Thus, the term in square brackets in (23) is also positive and we obtain that U A (c H ; a (c H ; 1) j H ). This completes the proof of existence of an allocation fc L ; c H g, satisfying the constraints of problem (12) 
. To see that the allocation proposed in this proof is in fact a solution to problem (12) for j = L, note that in any solution to problem (12) the payo¤ of the principal of type L cannot exceed the …rst-best total surplus S(a 0 L ; L ), otherwise constraint IR( L ) would be violated. Finally, any menu fc L ; c H g solving problem (12) 
L . This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Proof. (of Lemma 4) When constraints IC( L ) and IR( H ) of Problem 2 hold with equality, they de…ne continuous functions t H of q H , which I denote by t C H (q H ) and t R H (q H ), respectively. Speci…cally, Before proceeding, note that the equilibrium concept adopted in this paper (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium) does not impose any restriction on beliefs b H (m) o¤-the-equilibrium path. However, even o¤-the-equilibrium path, it requires two things. First, it requires that b H (c; m) be consistent with beliefs b H (m) and prescribed equilibrium play by the principal when choosing a contract from m (consistency of beliefs). Second, it requires that the prescribed equilibrium play by the principal be optimal given beliefs b H (c; m); and that the prescribed agent's decision to accept or reject m be optimal given beliefs b H (m) and the continuation equilibrium following the acceptance of m (sequential rationality). Thus, any continuation equilibrium constructed in this proof must satisfy these requirements.
We are now in position to prove the result in the Proposition. Both types of principal proposing a menu m 2 M , followed by a continuation equilibrium in which the payo¤ to the -type principal e U P ( ) b U P ( ) for all 2 f L ; H g constitutes an equilibrium of the overall game if exist o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs and continuation equilibria such that no deviation to another menu is pro…table. Since a deviation to a menu that is rejected by the agent is trivially not optimal to the principal, this proof consists of showing that if a menu m 0 2 M is such that for all beliefs b H (m 0 ) and all continuation equilibria the agent accepts it, then there are also beliefs b H (m 0 ) and a continuation equilibrium in which the payo¤ to the principals of type L and of type H are no larger than b U P ( L ) and b U P ( H ), respectively. Let m 0 2 M be a menu that for all beliefs b H (m 0 ) and continuation equilibria following its proposal, the agent accepts it. Consider the following beliefs and continuation equilibrium following the proposal of 
otherwise the payo¤ to the principal of type L would be strictly larger than S(a 0 L ; L ), which by (3) (e¢ cient ex-post renegotiation) would imply a strictly negative expected payo¤ to the agent from accepting m 0 . This would violate the assumption that m 0 is always accepted by the agent. Now, there are two possible cases regarding menu m 0 which I consider separately. Case 1. Suppose that m 0 also satis…es U P (c; a (c; 0) j H ) b U P ( H ) for all c 2 m 0 . Then, in the above continuation equilibrium the payo¤s of both types of principal are no larger than those associated with the best separating allocation. As a consequence, the result that a continuation equilibrium in which the principal's payo¤s are no larger than b U P ( L ) and b U P ( H ) exists, trivially holds. If b U P ( H ) = S(a 0 H ; H ) (i.e., if Case 1 of the derivation of the best separating allocation holds), then by (3) (e¢ cient ex-post renegotiation) the agent's expected payo¤ is negative. If b U P ( H ) = S(a (q; 1); H ) (i.e., if Case 2 of the derivation of the best separating allocation holds), then by Lemma 8 all the contracts in C H specify a quantity q > q and so does the contract chosen by the principal of type H . From: (i) S(a (q; 1); H ) < S(a (q; 1); H ) for all q > q, which stems from concavity of S(a; H ) in a; (ii) the fact that a (q 0 H ; 1), which is smaller than a (q; 1), maximizes S(a; H )); and (iii) (3), which stems from e¢ cient ex-post renegotiation; it follows that the agent's expected payo¤ must be negative. Thus, both when b U P ( H ) = S(a 0 H ; H ) and when b U P ( H ) = S(a (q; 1); H ), the agent's expected payo¤ is negative in this continuation equilibrium. This is a contradiction as m 0 is by assumption a menu that is accepted by the agent for all beliefs b H (m 0 ) and continuation equilibrium. This completes the proof that (30) holds.
I next use the fact that m 0 must satisfy conditions (29) and (30) to construct a continuation equilibrium in which the principal's payo¤s are no larger than b U P ( L ) and b U P ( H ). (c; m 0 ) , contract e c L is the best contract for the principal of type L in m 0 ; and given beliefs e b H (c; m 0 ), the payo¤ of the principal of type H is b U P ( H ) if she chooses a contract in c 2 C H and, by de…nition of C H , a payo¤ smaller than b U P ( H ) if she chooses a contract in m 0 nC H . With these beliefs and continuation equilibrium, the agent accepts the menu proposal m 0 and the equilibrium payo¤ of the principal of type is no larger than b U P ( ), for all 2 f L ; H g. Suppose now that e c L 2 C H . Consider, in this case, the following beliefs and continuation equilibrium: b H (m 0 ) = e b H (e c L ; m 0 ); b H (c; m 0 ) = e b H (c; m 0 ) for all c 2 m 0 ; both types of principal choose contract e c L . Consistency of beliefs is trivially satis…ed in this equilibrium. The justi…cation of sequential rationality by the principal is the same as in the case in which e c L = 2 C H . In this continuation equilibrium, both types of principal have lower payo¤s than those associated with the best separating allocation: for the principal of type H this is obvious; while for the principal of type L the result follows from the fact that by condition (29) U P (e c L ; a (e c L ; 0) j L ) b U P ( L ), the fact that the expected payo¤ of the principal of type Consider now the principal of type H . Suppose that she proposes contract c H = (t H ; q 0 H ; e = 1) where t H = U A (0; q 0 H ; 1; a (q 0 H ; 1) j H ). I proceed in the same way as I did in the case of the principal of type L . I start by proving that the agent accepts this contract regard
